Bookbot

Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications 3

Ocena książki

Parametry

  • 832 strony
  • 30 godzin czytania

Więcej o książce

This is the third volume of the Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications. Since the publication of multi-Volume 1 a decade ago, game theory has continued to develop at a furious pace, and today it is the dominant tool in economic theory. The three volumes together cover the fundamental theoretical aspects, a wide range of applications to economics, several chapters on applications to political science and individual chapters on applications to disciplines as diverse as evolutionary biology, computer science, law, psychology and ethics. The authors are the most eminent practitioners in the field, including three Nobel Prize winners. The topics covered in the present volume include strategic ("Nash") equilibrium; incomplete information; two-person non-zero-sum games; noncooperative games with a continuum of players; stochastic games; industrial organization; bargaining, inspection; economic history; the Shapley value and its applications to perfectly competitive economies, to taxation, to public goods and to fixed prices; political science; law mechanism design; and game experimentation.

Zakup książki

Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications 3, Sergiu Hart, Robert J. Aumann

Język
Rok wydania
2002
Oprawa
(twarda)
Jak tylko się pojawi, wyślemy Ci wiadomość e-mail.

Metody płatności

5,0
Doskonała
1 Ocena

Brakuje nam tutaj Twojej recenzji.

Tytuł
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications 3
Język
angielski
Wydawca
Elsevier
Rok wydania
2002
Oprawa
twarda
Liczba stron
832
ISBN10
0444894284
ISBN13
9780444894281
Seria
Tagi
Biznes
Ocena
5 z 5
Opis
This is the third volume of the Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications. Since the publication of multi-Volume 1 a decade ago, game theory has continued to develop at a furious pace, and today it is the dominant tool in economic theory. The three volumes together cover the fundamental theoretical aspects, a wide range of applications to economics, several chapters on applications to political science and individual chapters on applications to disciplines as diverse as evolutionary biology, computer science, law, psychology and ethics. The authors are the most eminent practitioners in the field, including three Nobel Prize winners. The topics covered in the present volume include strategic ("Nash") equilibrium; incomplete information; two-person non-zero-sum games; noncooperative games with a continuum of players; stochastic games; industrial organization; bargaining, inspection; economic history; the Shapley value and its applications to perfectly competitive economies, to taxation, to public goods and to fixed prices; political science; law mechanism design; and game experimentation.