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From Morality to Virtue

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  • 296 stron
  • 11 godzin czytania

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Annotation In this book, Michael Slote offers the first full-scale foundational account of virtue ethics to have appeared since the recent revival of interest in the topic. Slote advocates a particular form of such ethics for its intuitive and structural advantages over Kantianism, utilitarianism, and common-sense morality, and he argues that the problems of other views can be avoided and a contemporary plausible version of virtue ethics achieved only by abandoning specifically moral concepts for general aretaic notions like admirability and virtue. The book defends a distinctive, intuitive, and symmetric ethical principle according to which we should balance self-concern with concern for others, but it also concludes that there is, contrary to utilitarianism, no single basis for status as a virtue nor any simple relation between the virtues and human well-being

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From Morality to Virtue, Michael A. Slote

Język
Rok wydania
1995
Oprawa
(miękka)
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Tytuł
From Morality to Virtue
Język
angielski
Rok wydania
1995
Oprawa
miękka
Liczba stron
296
ISBN10
0195093925
ISBN13
9780195093926
Seria
Tagi
Ocena
3 z 5
Opis
Annotation In this book, Michael Slote offers the first full-scale foundational account of virtue ethics to have appeared since the recent revival of interest in the topic. Slote advocates a particular form of such ethics for its intuitive and structural advantages over Kantianism, utilitarianism, and common-sense morality, and he argues that the problems of other views can be avoided and a contemporary plausible version of virtue ethics achieved only by abandoning specifically moral concepts for general aretaic notions like admirability and virtue. The book defends a distinctive, intuitive, and symmetric ethical principle according to which we should balance self-concern with concern for others, but it also concludes that there is, contrary to utilitarianism, no single basis for status as a virtue nor any simple relation between the virtues and human well-being