Winning Ugly

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After eleven weeks of bombing in the spring of 1999, the United States and NATO won the war in Kosovo, forcing Serbian troops to withdraw and allowing for an international presence in the region. However, questions arise about whether this conflict was inevitable or a result of failed diplomacy. Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon provide an in-depth analysis of the Kosovo crisis, exploring its causes, conduct, and consequences through interviews with key participants. They conclude that while significant diplomatic errors occurred before the war, avoiding the conflict would have been challenging. The authors highlight that NATO's strategy during the war was flawed, as Serbian forces managed to alter Kosovo's ethnic balance by displacing 1.5 million Albanians. Had the Serbs escalated their violence, NATO would have struggled to intervene effectively. Ultimately, NATO's victory stemmed from intensifying bombing, planning a ground invasion, and ramping up diplomatic efforts to convince Belgrade of their inevitable defeat. The Kosovo crisis serves as a cautionary tale about the complexities of using military force to prevent genocide and mass displacement, emphasizing the need to learn from past mistakes to inform future actions.