Alexander J. Field Kolejność książek (chronologicznie)

This examination delves into the implications of recent natural sciences research for two significant social scientific approaches: the economic/rational choice and the sociological/anthropological perspectives. It jointly considers the controversial operation of group selection in early human evolution and the likelihood of cognitive modularity—specific adaptations in our cognitive mechanisms and behaviors. Experimental findings reveal that individuals often cooperate in one-shot prisoner's dilemma (PD) games and reject positive offers in ultimatum games, challenging traditional notions of rationality. These predispositions seem unlikely to have been favored solely by individual-level natural selection. By emphasizing universal and variable aspects of human culture, brain function research, and refining ideas about levels of selection in evolution, the author argues that humans possess an innate PD solution module and are predisposed to learn supportive norms. Notably, the focus on the failure to harm, rather than merely providing assistance, emerges as a dominant form of altruistic behavior. While the primary reference point is economics, this work appeals to a wide range of scholars in social and behavioral sciences, natural scientists examining interdisciplinary implications, and educated lay readers interested in understanding human nature.