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Personal Knowledge. Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy

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  • 442 strony
  • 16 godzin czytania

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Books on epistemology tend to be dreary affairs. Epistemology, which is the branch of philosophy that studies how human beings acquire and "validate" their knowledge, tend to be largely speculative and logical. Most theories of epistemology that are inflicted upon the world are nothing more than highly artificial constructions of some philosopher's speculations as to how men "ought" to attain and validate their knowledge. Any correspondence to how men really attain knowledge is usually pure coincidence. Moreover, in many instances, the epistemological philosopher has some special agenda which he is seeking to impose on his readers by confusing them with a mass of epistemological pedantry. He may be trying to prove the validity of a largely speculative form of "reason" or of definitions or of certainty or of a perfect a immaculate form of "objectivity" or of some other equally utopian and irrelevant principle

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Personal Knowledge. Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy, Michael Polanyi

Język
Rok wydania
1974
Oprawa
(miękka)
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Tytuł
Personal Knowledge. Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy
Język
angielski
Rok wydania
1974
Oprawa
miękka
Liczba stron
442
ISBN10
0226672883
ISBN13
9780226672885
Seria
Ocena
4,25 z 5
Opis
Books on epistemology tend to be dreary affairs. Epistemology, which is the branch of philosophy that studies how human beings acquire and "validate" their knowledge, tend to be largely speculative and logical. Most theories of epistemology that are inflicted upon the world are nothing more than highly artificial constructions of some philosopher's speculations as to how men "ought" to attain and validate their knowledge. Any correspondence to how men really attain knowledge is usually pure coincidence. Moreover, in many instances, the epistemological philosopher has some special agenda which he is seeking to impose on his readers by confusing them with a mass of epistemological pedantry. He may be trying to prove the validity of a largely speculative form of "reason" or of definitions or of certainty or of a perfect a immaculate form of "objectivity" or of some other equally utopian and irrelevant principle