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Games and Decisions

Ocena książki

Parametry

  • 509 stron
  • 18 godzin czytania

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This book serves as an accessible introduction to game theory and decision-making models for non-mathematicians. It presents a clear and detailed exposition of key ideas without the burden of technical mathematical details. The text offers a comprehensive conceptual framework with a social science perspective, covering decision theory, modern utility theory, statistical decision theory, and social welfare functions. The initial chapters introduce game theory and utility theory, while subsequent chapters delve into two-person zero-sum games, nonzero-sum games, and address gaps in the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory. Later chapters explore "n-"person games, incorporating both foundational concepts and newer developments. The final chapters focus on individual and group decision-making processes. Additionally, eight appendixes provide proofs of the minimax theorem, geometric interpretations of two-person zero-sum games, solution procedures, infinite games, sequential compounding, and linear programming. Thought-provoking and clearly articulated, this resource is tailored for those without advanced mathematical training, making it valuable for economists, political scientists, sociologists, experimental psychologists, management scientists, philosophers, and statisticians, as well as students in mathematical game theory and linear programming courses.

Wydanie

Zakup książki

Games and Decisions, Robert Duncan Luce, Howard Raiffa

Język
Rok wydania
1957
Oprawa
(twarda)
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Metody płatności

3,8
Bardzo dobra
130 Ocena

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Tytuł
Games and Decisions
Język
angielski
Rok wydania
1957
Oprawa
twarda
Liczba stron
509
ISBN10
0471553417
ISBN13
9780471553410
Seria
Ocena
3,8 z 5
Opis
This book serves as an accessible introduction to game theory and decision-making models for non-mathematicians. It presents a clear and detailed exposition of key ideas without the burden of technical mathematical details. The text offers a comprehensive conceptual framework with a social science perspective, covering decision theory, modern utility theory, statistical decision theory, and social welfare functions. The initial chapters introduce game theory and utility theory, while subsequent chapters delve into two-person zero-sum games, nonzero-sum games, and address gaps in the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory. Later chapters explore "n-"person games, incorporating both foundational concepts and newer developments. The final chapters focus on individual and group decision-making processes. Additionally, eight appendixes provide proofs of the minimax theorem, geometric interpretations of two-person zero-sum games, solution procedures, infinite games, sequential compounding, and linear programming. Thought-provoking and clearly articulated, this resource is tailored for those without advanced mathematical training, making it valuable for economists, political scientists, sociologists, experimental psychologists, management scientists, philosophers, and statisticians, as well as students in mathematical game theory and linear programming courses.